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I. Introduction*
Much of the current debate on worldwide environmental protection
resembles the traditional North-South confrontation on poverty
alleviation and economic development in the Third World. Again
there is a wide consensus on the goals to be reached. However,
when it comes to responsibilities and instruments by which to
achieve the desired results, the well-known battle-array is re-
instated. In the first instance, this refers to the questions of
who has to pay for the preservation of the environment, by which
financial means, and under which conditions. As experienced in
former North-South negotiations, economic fundamentals are again
neglected by both parties:
- Industrialized countries are reluctant to meet the South's
demands for external financing of environmental protection in
the Third World. This appears to be mainly because these
demands are largely based on the debatable proposition that
former exploitation by the North requires compensation today.
But there may well be an economic justification for financial
compensation if developing countries are asked to preserve the
environment (Section II).
- Economic fundamentals must also be taken into account when
assessing the effectiveness of optional financing instruments.
As argued in Section III, the proposals advanced so far largely
ignore past experience with regard to the effects of concessio-
nal transfers to the South. Most of the options currently dis-
cussed are ill-suited to contain environmental degradation and
to achieve an economically adequate financial compensation.
Finally, suggestions are presented on how financial support for
developing countries could be organized so that the incentives
for environmental protection are strengthened effectively (Sec-
tion IV) .
* Paper presented at the First Geneva Environment Meeting "En-
vironment and Development: Conflict and Convergence" in Geneva,
May 14-15, 1992. Critical comments and helpful suggestions on
an earlier version of this paper by Markus Diehl, Norbert Fun-
ke, Johannes Heister and Ulrich Hiemenz are gratefully acknowl-
edged. I would also like to express my gratitude to the German
Ministry of Economic Co-operation, and especially Enno Carsten-
sen, for providing most valuable background information and
material on the Global Environment Facility and related issues.- 2 -
II. The Economic Rationale for Financial Compensation
On the agenda for the UN Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment (UNCED) in June 1992, issues such as the protection of the
atmosphere, the conservation of biological diversity, the fight
against deforestation, desertification and land degradation, as
well as the sound management of hazardous wastes and toxic chemi-
cals figure prominently [Willums, Goliike, 1991, pp. 467ff.]. The
reason for an international agreement on these topics is that the
production of the public good "environmental protection" remains
below optimum in the case of cross-border externalities. As con-
cerns deforestation, for example, the economic benefits of ex-
ploiting or burning the tropical rainforests fully accrue to the
country in question, whereas the social costs in terms of long-
term climate changes are not only shifted to future generations
but also to other nations. Hence, the critical economic problem
is to internalize external effects so that production decisions
are based on international social costs [Coase, I960].
At the national level, the internalization of external environ-
mental effects is aimed at by various command and control
measures as well as market-based instruments such as ecological
taxes (eco-taxes) [Pearce, 1991]. Principally, similar approaches
may be applied at an international scale. However, international
regulation suffers from serious shortcomings. Agreements on en-
vironmental protection among sovereign states are subject to
considerable enforcement problems. The breach of international
contracts and earlier commitments to reduce the production of
environmentally damaging goods is difficult to be sanctioned
effectively [Mohr, 1991].
International coordination of environmental protection is par-
ticularly difficult with regard to developing countries. In the
current debate on the agenda for UNCED, industrialized countries
appear to be tempted to "force" more environmental quality on the
Third World than the latter is willing to supply. This conflict
is not surprising insofar as the demand for environmental quality- 3 -
rises more than proportionately as per capita income grows. In
other words, citizens of highly developed economies assign a
higher priority to worldwide environmental protection than citi-
zens of poor countries whose major concern frequently is to sur-
vive in the short term.
Given that natural resources are typically underrated assets in
developing countries and damages are largely external, Third
World governments face strong disincentives to join and adhere to
international agreements. Contract stability may be enhanced by
foreign transfers that are linked to environmental protection by
the recipients. Such transfers represent a financial compensation
by which countries with low time preference rates may induce
countries with high time preference rates to surrender the option
of an excessive exploitation of natural resources.
The concept of financial compensation raises various problems.
Most evidently the overall amount of transfers, its distribution
among the potential beneficiaries and the payment obligations of
individual donor countries have to be determined. Three factors
must be taken into account when deciding on these questions [Ame-
lung, 1991]: (1) the opportunity costs of developing countries
2
forgoing the option of environmental degradation; (2) the costs
of environmental degradation which accrue to these countries
themselves; and (3) the external costs suffered by other coun-
tries. The need for financial compensation increases, ceteris
paribus, with higher opportunity costs (1), lower local costs of
environmental degradation (2), and higher external costs (3). But
the amount and distribution of transfers could only be quantified
easily if all cost functions were identified unambiguously.
This assumption reflects the conventional wisdom [see e.g.
Baumol, Oates, 1988]; it is critically discussed by Pearce,
Barbier, Markandya [1990, pp. llff.].
2
In the case of containing deforestation, the opportunity costs
relate to e.g. forgone exports of tropical wood, the abstention
from using the respective areas for agricultural production or
mineral extraction, and the substitution of domestic energy
sources.- 4 -
Practically, the required information is incomplete so that
transfers have to be negotiated on the basis of approximated
costs and benefits. Strategic behaviour is to be expected during
the bargaining process. From the UNCED negotiations it is evi-
dent, for example, that potential beneficiaries have an incentive
to understate the local costs and overstate the economic benefits
of environmental degradation in order to maximize transfer pay-
ments. In addition, developing countries are pressing for a wide
and vague definition of the so-called "incremental costs prin-
ciple" [World Bank, 1990; World Bank, UNDP, UNEP, 1992].
This principle is only consistent with the concept of financial
compensation if concessionary and additional funding is restric-
ted to the extra costs for achieving global environmental bene-
fits. There may be cases where distinguishing global from natio-
2
nal benefits is difficult. However, it would be clearly in-
appropriate if incremental costs and, thereby, external funding
were determined against a reference case of business-as-usual.
Consider an economy where the existing policy framework has re-
sulted in severe macroeconomic and ecological distortions. Cor-
rective action undertaken in the context of sustainable national
development strategies might involve considerable adjustment
costs [World Bank, UNDP, UNEP, 1992, p. 8]. But financial compen-
sation is not required for adjustment costs that are matched by
national welfare gains in terms of greater economic efficiency
and local ecological improvements in the aftermath of policy
reforms.
Strategic bargaining positions may have to be abandoned when
additional information on costs and benefits becomes available
during negotiations [Amelung, 1991, pp. 172ff.].
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On further difficulties to make the incremental costs principle
operational and on possible solutions with regard to the
Interim Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol, see World
Bank [1990], It is shown that incremental cost computations are
extremely sensitive to changes in world market conditions for
ozone-depleting substances and possible substitutes, changes in
the national policy design, and the choice of the discount
rate.- 5 -
Furthermore, financial compensation requires that the global
environmental obligations of the beneficiaries are clearly de-
fined and enforceable. Irrespective of the overall amount of
transfers, it cannot be taken for granted that ecological im-
provements will take place in the recipient countries. This is
only to be expected if an effective linkage is established be-
tween environmental protection in and transfers to developing
countries. Hence, the concept of financial compensation also
requires a careful design of financing instruments. As argued in
the subsequent section, the critical issue of contract stability,
i.e. the interplay between adequate financial transfers and eco-
logical improvements, has not yet received appropriate attention
in the current debate on international environmental agreements.
Ill. A Critical Review of Financial Instruments
Demands for additional international transfers to finance en-
vironmental protection in developing countries are abound [e.g.
South Commission, 1990, pp. 258 ff.; Miller, Reid, Barber, 1991,
pp. 107ff.; ECLA, 1991, pp. 113ff.]. Vastly different estimates
are presented with regard to the overall amount of transfers
required to compensate developing countries. It is difficult to
assess the economic justification of these estimates. Typically,
the underlying objectives, i.e. the type and scope of conserva-
Social democrats in Germany claim that the industrialized coun-
tries must raise US$ 10-20 billion per annum [Frankfurter Rund-
schau, February 21, 1992]. The World Resources Institute
estimated in 1989 that the annual requirement for environmental
investment in the Third World amounts to US$ 20-50 billion
[quoted in: Rosebrock, Sondhof, 1991]. According to Maurice
Strong, developing countries will need as much as US$ 125 bil-
lion per annum to introduce the measures likely to be approved
at the UNCED summit in June 1992; 60 per cent of this sum must
be new money, while the rest could come from existing aid pro-
grams [Financial Times, February 14, 1992]. In the global tax
scheme considered by Whalley and Wigle [1989], developing coun-
tries would receive nearly US$ 500 billion worth of side-pay-
ments to participate in a scheme intended to cut CO,, emissions
by 50 per cent.- 6 -
tion measures to be financed, remain unclear. Furthermore, finan-
cial compensation, which relates to the global external effects
of conservation measures, is frequently confused with the total
financing needs. The latter include the local costs that are
matched by internal benefits. It does not make much sense to
quantify the amount of transfers unless the environmental obliga-
tions of the recipients are specified. Therefore, the following
discussion concentrates on the question whether recently proposed
financial instruments are consistent with the basic principles of
the concept of financial compensation.
The "creative and innovative" financing techniques proposed so
far [Brundtland Commission, 1987, ch. 12; Development Committee,
1988; Mattos de Lemos, 1991, pp. 340f.] have in common that they
address only specific aspects of financial compensation. Inter-
national eco-taxes may provide a funding mechanism, while the
distribution of funds among developing countries is left open
(Section III.l). Conversely, the suggested increase of develop-
ment aid and project lending for environmental purposes as well
as debt-reduction schemes focus on the distribution of transfers,
implicitly assuming that sufficient funds could be raised by the
donors (Sections III. 2-4). The second common characteristic of
recent proposals is that the relative merits and flaws of dif-
ferent financial options are hardly discussed and previous expe-
riences with similar instruments are largely ignored.
1. Funding by International Eco-Taxes: Old Wine in New Bottles
As concerns taxation for environmental purposes, major differen-
ces exist with regard to the underlying motivation of tax
measures. A first group of proposals focuses on identifying sub-
jects for taxation which would provide a taxation base broad
For example it might well be in the interest of countries with
tropical rainforests to contain deforestation. The stabiliza-
tion of local ecological systems helps a sustainable agri-
cultural development and a sufficient water supply. Moreover,
the chances for revenues from tourism in the future may be
improved by containing deforestation [Siebert, 1991, pp. lOf.].- 7 -
enough to raise substantial new funds for financing environmental
protection. A second group suggests to introduce specific taxes
that would reduce the emission and production of environmentally-
damaging goods. It goes without saying that financial compensa-
tion cannot be achieved by taxation alone. Tax proposals have to
be supplemented by an incentive-compatible distribution of tax
revenues (see Sections III.2-4). The critical question to be dis-
cussed in this section is whether the funding mechanism of recent
tax proposals is consistent with the earlier presented concept of
financial compensation.
When the aspect of financing dominates, the proposed tax measures
largely refer to suggestions that figured prominently in various
rounds of North-South negotiations over decades. The only dif-
ference is that the focus is now on environmental protection as
the major purpose for which the mobilization of additional re-
sources is required. The most frequently suggested subjects for
taxation are: ocean fishing and transportation, seabed mining ,
the exploitation of antarctic resources, trade surpluses, and
international trade in general [see e.g. Willums, Goliike, 1991,
pp. 661f.; Brundtland Commission, 1987].
Taxation of economic activities in the above fields is justified
economically only to the extent that natural resources are ex-
ploited excessively because of external costs, e.g. in the case
of ocean fishing and seabed mining. Even if this condition is
met, it has to be taken into account that tax schemes involve
relatively high administrative costs [Mohr, 1991]. Moreover, the
effects of taxation on the conservation or recovery of natural
resources remain uncertain because of incomplete information on
the reaction of taxpayers (for an alternative approach, i.e. to
issue tradable permits for a limited use of natural resources,
see Section IV).
The argument of external costs is not applicable to a general
taxation of trading activities. The appealing property of trade
taxes is rather that substantial public resources could be- 8 -
generated easily. International trade constitutes a fairly broad
tax base. Annual transfers to developing countries of US$ 125
billion (the figure given by Maurice Strong) could be financed if
world exports were taxed at a rate of 3-4 per cent. Arguably,
the fairly low tax rate would contain the international welfare
loss resulting from distortions in the international division of
labour. Nevertheless, the funding of environmental protection
through a general taxation of external trade is seriously flawed
in several respects:
- The incidence of trade taxes may largely fall on economies
which, according to the concept of financial compensation,
should rather be financed by tax-related transfers. The share
of funding provided by the developing countries themselves may
significantly exceed their share in world exports of about 25
per cent in 1990. This applies especially to developing coun-
tries which heavily depend on imported intermediate and capital
goods. The price elasticity of their import demand is probably
fairly low. Hence, trade taxes would result in a higher import
bill for these countries. Similarly, export-oriented economies
in the Third World would have to shoulder a significant part of
the funding of tax-related transfers when the demand for their
export goods is highly price elastic.
- It is open to question whether environmental conditions will
improve when international trade is taxed. Domestic producers
favoured by trade taxes may even absorb more environmental
inputs than discriminated exporters so that the quality of the
environment would deteriorate. Moreover, transfers financed
through trade taxes do not necessarily result in environmental
protection in the recipient countries. This would only be the
case if transfers were closely linked to protective measures by
the beneficiaries and problems of monitoring and enforcing
conditionality were overcome.
1 World exports amounted to US$ 3310 billion in 1990 [IMF, Inter-
national Financial Statistics].- 9 -
- Developing countries may reject the required conditionality
from the beginning, if they anticipate that the tax-related
public transfers offered to them will only replace inflows of
private capital. Considerable substitution effects are likely,
in particular if taxes are levied on trade surpluses. To the
extent that trade surpluses of developed with developing coun-
tries are curtailed by taxes, private financing of the cor-
responding deficits of developing countries becomes super-
fluous. Under such conditions, the incentive of the recipients
of public transfers to protect the environment is reduced to
the grant element of official capital inflows.
Typical examples of the second group of tax proposals are taxes
levied on specific emissions of hazardous wastes and toxic chemi-
cals, e.g. C00 emissions [see Mohr, 1991, pp. 192ff., and the
literature given there], as well as specific goods such as tropi-
cal wood [see Amelung, 1989, p. 155, and the literature given
there]. Financial compensation of developing countries is diffi-
cult to achieve by specific taxes, the underlying motivation of
which is to reduce environmental damage. Consider the case of an
emission tax to be raised in industrialized countries, which are
the major polluters. A tax scheme aiming at gradually reducing
emissions requires progressive tax rates over time. The amount of
tax revenues, which may then be transfered to developing coun-
tries, declines as soon as the positive funding effect of higher
tax rates is overcompensated by a shrinking tax base. In the
extreme case of the tax scheme succeeding to stop emissions, tax
revenues will be zero. The prospect of declining transfers adds
to the disincentives of the recipients to join an international
agreement on the reduction of emissions and adhere to ecological
conditionality.
This argument also applies to product-specific trade restric-
tions. If import taxes are becoming prohibitive, the foreign
demand for the taxed good and, therefore, tax-related transfers
approach zero. Specific trade taxes have further drawbacks
Prohibitively high import taxes are comparable to an outright
import ban which would not generate any revenues out of which
transfers could be financed.- 10 -
especially if the taxed good is supplied by developing countries.
An import tax on tropical wood, for example, will have limited
environmental effects at best if the conservation of rainforests
is only achieved at a cost in terms of intensified deforestation
elsewhere. It is to be expected that timber exports by Scandi-
navian countries and the, states of the former Soviet Union will
largely replace exports of tropical wood by developing countries.
Moreover, trade taxes only constrain foreign demand, whereas the
domestic demand remains unaffected. The smaller the proportion of
deforestation that is due to exports of tropical wood, for
example, the weaker would be the effect of taxes on the preserva-
tion of rainforests. And, finally, the incidence of import taxes
may largely fall on exporters in developing countries, rather
than consumers in industrialized countries. Under conditions of a
highly price-elastic foreign demand, tax-related transfers would
be "financed" through lower export proceeds by the developing
countries themselves. Hence, financial compensation would not
take place. All in all, developing countries can not reasonably
be expected to join an agreement on environmental protection when
transfers are based on specific eco-taxes.
2. Unconditional Transfers: Lessons from Development Aid
The preceding discussion leads to the conclusion that internatio-
nal eco-taxes are an inadequate means to mobilize funds for
financial compensation. The call is for funding mechanisms which
ensure adequate financial compensation, while minimizing the
distortionary impact of fund raising. This might be achieved if
industrialized countries mobilized additional aid payments by
general tax increases or, preferably, compensating cuts in gov-
ernment spending.
The need to increase aid payments is frequently emphasized [e.g.
Amelung and Diehl [1992] have estimated that forestry accounts
for 10-15 per cent of deforestation in developing countries, of
which roughly one third can be attributed to exports of tropi-
cal wood.- 11 -
Brundtland Commission, 1987; South Commission, 1990]. But the
implicit assumption that environmental conditions in the reci-
pient countries will be improved in this way is hardly discussed.
Externally imposed conditionality is often explicitly rejected.
The rationale for unconditional foreign aid rests on two debat-
s
able propositions: (i) more aid alleviates poverty, and (ii)
2
poverty alleviation enhances environmental protection. The
second assumption is plausible to the extent that time preference
rates decline with rising per-capita income. It is open to ques-
tion, however, whether the relationship between the income level
and environmental protection is unambiguously positive over the
whole range from least developed to newly industrializing coun-
tries. The functional form may rather reveal a U-shaped pattern
if the early phases of industrialization are characterized by an
intensified use of environmental resources. Furthermore, environ-
mental problems that are poverty related are typically of a local
character. Financial compensation is not required to strengthen
the incentives to environmental protection as long as the bene-
fits fully accrue to the developing country, i.e. in the absence
of international spillovers.
Even in the case of a strictly positive income-environment nexus,
higher aid transfers will not live up to the expectations of
environmentalists as long as poverty in the recipient countries
is not alleviated considerably. Previous experience with develop-
ment aid justifies scepticism:
- Official development assistance (ODA) by DAC countries totalled
about US$ 100 billion in 1989-1990 [OECD, 1991a, p. 171]. For
See e.g. South Commission [1990, p. 260]: "A new, environment-
related form of conditionality - to be added to that imposed on
the South by the international financial institutions - is
utterly unacceptable".
2
The latter proposition follows directly from the argument that
environmental degradation, e.g. deforestation and water pollu-
tion, is mainly due to poverty and economic backwardness [see
e.g. the Declaration of Beijing adopted in June 1991 by 41
developing countries (published in: Beijing Rundschau 27/1991,
pp. 11-15) and the communique of the Cartagena meeting of
UNCTAD in February 1992].- 12 -
low-income countries in Africa, the Middle East and Latin Ame-
rica, ODA receipts amounted, on average, to 11-12 per cent of
the recipients' GNP [OECD, 1991a, p. 189].
1 Even doubled ODA
payments could at best have a moderate impact on poverty alle-
viation, considering that ODA not only comprises outright
grants, but also concessional credits which have to be repaid.
Moreover, it is rather dubious that the lack of capital con-
stitutes the major bottleneck to poverty alleviation in low-
income countries.
- The idea that the Third World's economic situation could be
improved substantially through financial aid has been in-
creasingly disputed since the early 1980s. In the past, the
correlation between the per-capita amount of ODA received and
the growth of per-capita income in the recipient countries
remained completely insignificant [Kostrzewa, Nunnenkamp,
2
Schmieding, 1990, pp. 35f.]. More sophisticated econometric
investigations revealed that positive growth effects of aid
largely failed to materialize where they were most urgently
needed, i.e., in the poorest Third World countries, in Africa
and in strongly commodity dependent economies [see Hiemenz,
1986, and the literature given there]. Moreover, a number of
studies demonstrated a quite obvious negative influence of
foreign aid on domestic savings in the recipient countries.
- Some observers even consider development aid as one of the
roots of deteriorating economic conditions in the recipient
countries [e.g. Bauer, 1982]. Unconditional and permanent aid
tends to reinforce misguided economic policies and adds to
distortions in relative prices and production patterns. Typi-
cally, the ruling elites in the recipient countries exert
strict control over the use of aid inflows. This leverage
allows them to block policy reforms (e.g. land reforms) that
The respective share for low-income countries in Asia was only
1.4 per cent, due to extremely low shares for India and China.
2
The correlation coefficients remain fairly stable if the sample
heterogeneity is reduced. For example, the aid-growth nexus is
also extremely weak for different income groups.- 13 -
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could help overcome economic backwardness. Furthermore, rent
seeking of economic agents is encouraged, while making pro-
ductive efforts of one's own may no longer be regarded worth-
while in aid dependent economies.
These arguments suggest that aid flows of whatever magnitude
cannot be a substitute for sound economic and ecological manage-
ment and appropriate policy incentives in the recipient countries
[Hiemenz, 1989]. Any increase of aid does not make much of a
difference if the ruling elites in developing countries are un-
willing to remove the internal impediments to environmental con-
servation. However, external donors may play a catalytic role if
aid recipients are committed to reduce poverty and contain en-
vironmental degradation. In the following, it is discussed whe-
ther the implementation of internal reforms could be supported by
(i) foreign debt relief and (ii) new forms of project lending.
3. Debt Reduction: A Debatable Linkage
Environmental degradation in highly indebted developing countries
has led to the appealing proposition that the solution of debt
problems is a prerequisite for environmental improvement [e.g.
Enquete-Kommission, 1990, pp. 368ff.; Schreiber, 1989]. It is
argued that debt reduction provides a means of financial compen-
sation since creditor concessions would remove the disincentives
to environmental protection resulting from a high foreign debt
burden [see also Trisoglio, ten Kate, 1991, p. 429]. The under-
lying argument is that natural resources are exploited exces-
sively by highly indebted countries which have to generate for-
eign exchange in order to remain current on their debt-service
obligations. Environmental degradation is considered to be the
result of the developing countries' attempt to contain the risk
of default and avoid the potential costs of default by exporting
environment-intensive goods. The costs of default are related to
sanctions which may be imposed by the creditors on non-performing
debtors.- 14 -
The relation between the degree of indebtedness and environmental
degradation is no longer straightforward under more realistic
assumptions on the behaviour of sovereign debtors. The credibili-
ty and time-consistency of sanctions proclaimed by creditors is
highly debatable [see e.g. Froot, Scharfstein, Stein, 1988].
Actually, debtor countries have anticipated time and again the
willingness of creditors to agree to reschedulings after payment
problems had emerged, rather than to impose sanctions. We have
also experienced unilateral defaults and payment suspensions. The
incentive to service the foreign debt at the expense of environ-
mental conditions no longer dominates as soon as the benefits of
default, in terms of retained debt-service payments, exceed the
costs of default [Amelung, 1991]. The same applies if debt
obligations are high enough so that even an excessive exploita-
tion of natural resources cannot prevent default. Under such
conditions, partial debt relief may result in more rather than
less environmental degradation.
Preliminary empirical evidence supports the theoretical reasoning
on a weak and ambiguous relation between the degree of indebted-
ness and environmental degradation. A simple correlation analysis
for various debt indicators on the one hand and the degree of
deforestation in 21 countries with tropical rainforests on the
other hand reveals no statistically significant relationship for
the 1980s [Nunnenkamp, Amelung, 1991]. The results indicate that
deforestation is not generally higher in countries with a higher
debt burden, and increasing foreign debt is not necessarily asso-
ciated with an intensified deforestation over time. Consequently,
the effects of unconditional debt-reduction schemes on the pre-
servation of the environment are uncertain at best, as was the
case with higher unconditional aid payments.
In order to strengthen the effects of debt relief on environmen-
tal protection, it has been proposed to make relief operations
conditional on conservation measures by the beneficiaries. Such a
linkage is established in the context of debt-for-nature swaps
[Schreiber, 1989]. Basically, the swaps involve three steps: (i)- 15 -
foreign debt titles of the country in question are purchased in
the secondary market at a discount on their face value; (ii) the
debt titles are presented to the debtor government and converted
into domestic currency, whereby the total amount of outstanding
foreign debt is reduced; and (iii) the domestic currency equiva-
lent is used to finance environmental projects in the debtor
country.
Until recently, financial compensation through debt-for-nature
swaps has played a marginal role. The face value of foreign debt
involved in the swaps arranged in eight countries amounted to
about US$ 100 million; US$ 60 million in local currency were
generated for conservation purposes [World Bank, 1991, pp.
106£.]. The financial compensation achieved by the swaps is much
2
lower than these figures suggest, and may even be negative. The
swap operations would offer foreign debt relief only if (i) the
buyer of the debt title realized a greater discount on the face
value than could be obtained by the debtor country through a
.direct buyback, and (ii) the higher discount were passed on to
the debtor country. The debtor country does not benefit from
secondary market discounts at all, if the foreign debt title is
converted at par into domestic currency. Of course, the debt
burden in foreign currency is reduced by debt-for-nature swaps.
Nevertheless, the swaps may lead to an additional fiscal burden
in the debtor country. This will happen to the extent that the
government issues domestic debt paper to redeem the foreign debt,
and if domestic real interest rates exceed the international rate
(adjusted for exchange rate changes).
The chances for financial compensation through debt-for-nature
swaps further decline if this instrument will be used on a larger
In early 1991, five more swap programs valued at approximately
US$ 500 million were in preparation [Rosebrock, Sondhof, 1991].
2
In the following, it is assumed that environmental projects
financed through swap operations would not be undertaken by the
developing country in any case. This assumption is reasonable
if the swap operations involve projects with considerable
cross-border effects.- 16 -
scale than in the past. An increased demand for debt titles would
reduce the secondary market discounts, thereby diminishing the
potential for debt relief. Furthermore, a broader implementation
of debt-for-nature swaps may result in higher macroeconomic in-
stability in the debtor country. Inflation is fuelled if the
domestic currency equivalent of the foreign debt is raised by
money creation. Alternatively, the fiscal situation may deteri-
orate if domestic debt replaces foreign debt [Nunnenkamp, Ame-
lung, 1991]. This is particularly likely in the case of narrow
domestic capital markets.
It can be concluded that the financial compensation to be
achieved by debt-for-nature swaps remains limited at best. Conse-
quently, it will also be difficult to improve the environmental
conditions in developing countries with this instrument. The
incentives of debtor countries to conserve the environment are
not strengthened effectively. The governments are rather tempted
to violate the ecological conditions attached to the swap [for
empirical evidence, see Page, 1989]. The breach of earlier com-
mitments can hardly be sanctioned effectively, once the swap
operation has been completed and the foreign debt title has been
fully redeemed.
Furthermore, causes for environmental degradation which are not
related to the foreign debt situation are not tackled by the swap
concept. Even in highly indebted countries, an excessive exploi-
tation of natural resources, e.g. in the context of deforesta-
tion, is largely due to internal factors such as local demand for
energy, raw materials and agricultural products. Environmental
degradation in countries without foreign debt problems is not
tackled at all. Deforestation in countries such as Indonesia,
Malaysia and Thailand may even accelerate to the extent that
debt-for-nature swaps arranged in highly indebted countries with
Even though swap operations remained fairly small in the past,
secondary market prices increased significantly as soon as
market participants expected a swap to take place [Hansen,
1989].- 17 -
tropical rainforests result in higher world market prices of
tropical wood. In other words, financial compensation in the
context of debt-for-nature swaps is not only insufficient, but
the distribution of compensatory transfers is also biased and not
effectively related to the causes of environmental degradation.
4. Project Lending for Environmental Purposes: No Panacea
The conceptual shortcomings of project financing in the context
of debt-for-nature swaps could be overcome if project lending for
environmental purposes were adequately funded and not restricted
to highly indebted countries. First steps in this direction have
already been taken, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) re-
presenting the most notable example. The GEF is a pilot scheme
for helping developing countries with a per-capita income of less
than US$ 4000 to solve global environmental problems. The aim is
to give developing countries a financial incentive to pay atten-
tion to externalities [Prowse, 1992]. Projects in four main areas
are financed: reducing global warming, protecting international
waters, preserving biological diversity, and preventing further
2
depletion of the stratospheric ozone-layer. The GEF may "set the
stage for future funding mechanisms for global environmental
projects" [Brugger, Clemencon, 1991, p. 495; see also OECD,
1991b]. However, it has to be clarified in the ongoing negoti-
ations (i) how to finance a global facility on a stable and eco-
nomically sound basis beyond the pilot phase of the GEF, and (ii)
how to decide on the distribution of available funds.
The GEF was established in November 1990 and is jointly managed
by the World Bank and the UN's Development and Environment
Programmes. For a three-year experimental period, the GEF can
commit up to US$ 1.3 billion in grants and technical assistance
to help developing countries tackle environmental problems. The
available funding includes US$ 200 million provided by the
Montreal Protocol on ozone-depleting emissions [for details,
see Finance and Development, 19 91; World Bank, 19 91a; World
Bank, 1991b, pp. lOOff.].
2
For detailed project information, see World Bank, UNDP, UNEP
[1991, especially Part II: Work Program].
For a broader list of issues to be discussed with regard to the
future evolution of the GEF, see World Bank, UNDP, UNEP [Novem-
ber 1991, Part I, pp. 22f.].- 18 -
As concerns the financing of sustained project lending for en-
vironmental purposes, it has been proposed to collect annual
contributions by all countries, except the least developed econo-
mies, at a certain percentage share of their GDP [South Commis-
sion, 1990, p. 260]. Hence, contributions would increase with the
size and per-capita income of countries. For two reasons, such a
funding scheme is consistent with the concept of financial com-
pensation. First, the size of a country reflects its share in the
consumption of the public good "environmental protection".
Secondly, the level of per-capita income provides a proxy for
international differences in time preference rates [Amelung,
1991]. The degree of financial compensation to be achieved in
this way hinges on the extent to which the contributions to the
environmental facility are additional to traditional forms of
ODA.
1
A mere redistribution of existing ODA is feared by developing
countries [ECLA, 1991, p. 113]. It is hardly realized, however,
that the willingness of donor countries to mobilize additional
resources is likely to depend on the institutional arrangements
under which the distribution of project funds is decided upon.
The Group of 77 (G 77) is against using the GEF, under the
auspices of the World Bank, as the unitary financing mechanism
for global environmental conventions that are currently being
2
negotiated (e.g. on climate change and bio-diversity). Similar
to earlier North-South negotiations, the G 7 7 again favours the
creation of new institutions for which the prefered "one country,
one vote" principle would apply [Stahl, 1992; South Commission,
1990, p. 260]. Such a voting rule adds to the leverage of de-
By contrast, the overall degree of financial compensation is
not necessarily affected if environmental projects are financed
by concessional lending rather than outright grants. In the
case of concessional lending, financial compensation for one
particular project is reduced to the interest-rate differential
between the market rate and the subsidized rate. However, more
projects could be financed out of a given amount of donor con-
tributions if credits had to be repaid by the borrowers.
2
For the discussion of different options of future governance
and funding mechanisms, see World Bank, UNDP, UNEP [1992].- 19 -
veloping countries in deciding on the allocation of project
funds. According to the G77, there should be a separate fund for
each convention and a general fund, the so-called Green Fund, to
cover activities not included in separate conventions [United
Nations, 1991].
The G77 wants the Green Fund to be separated from the existing
GEF. The new fund should serve the "sustainable development needs
of developing countries, including Agenda 21" [United Nations,
1991, p. 2]; beneficiaries should have access "without any con-
ditionality" [ibid]. The funding of the Green Fund should be
based on mandatory contributions from developed countries. How-
ever, the funding is seriously endangered if industrialized coun-
tries anticipate that the principles of financial compensation
will be violated under a "one country, one vote" rule. Donors
could no longer enforce that concessional financing is only pro-
vided to prevent negative spillovers of national policies on the
environmental conditions in other countries. The overall environ-
mental impact of project financing becomes uncertain if the local
costs in the recipient countries are covered as well. Foreign
financing of environmental protection benefiting the recipient
country may merely replace domestic financing. Consequently, it
depends on the use of the freed domestic resources whether the
environmental conditions will improve or rather deteriorate.
There is no way for industrialized countries to influence the
allpcative decisions of recipient countries.
The replacement of domestic by foreign financing is minimized if
donor countries retain sovereignty with regard to the disburse-
ment of project funds. A voting rule which mirrors the relative
weight of donors in funding an environmental facility may con-
siderably help the mobilization of sufficient resources. Never-
For the example of a Biological Diversity Fund, see Intergov-
ernmental Negotiating Committee for a Convention on Biological
Diversity [1992]; for the example of a Climate Fund, see United
Nations [1992].- 20 -
theless, replacement effects cannot be ruled out completely. In
practice, it is often difficult to draw a clear dividing line
between the internal and the external costs of national policies
resulting in environmental degradation [Prowse, 1992]. Even under
incentive-compatible institutional arrangements, the effective-
ness of project lending remains limited unless the overall econo-
mic policy framework in the recipient countries ensures an ef-
ficient use of freed domestic resources.
This leads to the conclusion that the financing of projects with
environmental spillovers has to be complemented with a more
general concern for the environmental behaviour of recipient
countries [OECD, 1991b; World Bank, 1991b, pp. 109f.]. As argued
in Section III.2, external support should be increased if - and
only if - the ruling elites in developing countries are committed
to remove the internal impediments to environmental improvements.
The catalytic role of external support may then be enhanced if
project lending is not confined to narrowly defined environmental
purposes, as is the case for the present GEF. In the context of
environmental protection, donors should also support institution
building and human resource development. Deficiencies in these
areas constitute major bottlenecks for the economic and ecologi-
cal development of Third World economies [Hiemenz, 1989]. For
example, external donors should help the establishment of courts
and independent executive bodies so that property rights could be
defined, protected and enforced. They may also help the transfer
of managerial and technological know-how, in order to contain
environmental degradation in the process of industrialization.
"There is a close relationship between economic policy and the
environment. ... Hence, although the technical design of some
investment projects may be sound, the environmental sustain-
ability of these investments may be seriously jeopardized if
policies are mutually contradictory" [ECLA, 1991, p. 120].- 21 -
IV. The Way Forward; Some Suggestions on Financial Compensation
1. Basic Guidelines
Financial compensation of developing countries is a necessity to
the extent that industrialized countries assign a relatively high
priority to worldwide environmental protection and international
spillovers of national policies prevail. Presently, it is im-
possible to determine the overall amount of transfers required.
Informational deficiencies render it also difficult to devise
efficient mechanisms with regard to the funding .and distribution
of transfers, as well as to establish an effective linkage be-
tween transfers and environmental protection by the benefici-
aries.
In practice, transfers have to be determined in a bargaining
process on the basis of incomplete information on costs and bene-
fits. However, the concept of financial compensation suggests
some basic guidelines which appear to be largely ignored in the
ongoing North-South negotiations:
- First, financial compensation is frequently confused with in-
vestment needs for environmental purposes in the Third World.
Concessional external financing is not required to the extent
that the investment-related welfare improvements accrue to the
country itself. It can reasonably be assumed that the need for
financial compensation is substantially below the overall costs
of environmental conservation.
- Secondly, the financial instruments discussed so far focus on
the mobilization or the distribution among beneficiaries of
funds for environmental protection. An integrated concept
addressing both issues in a way which is consistent with finan-
cial compensation has not yet been developed.
- Thirdly, recent proposals on international financing of en-
vironmental protection in developing countries largely ignore
the experiences with similar instruments in the past.- 22 -
2. Mobilization of Funds
As concerns the international mobilization of funds for environ-
mental protection, most of the widely acknowledged eco-tax pro-
posals are inconsistent with the concept of financial compensa-
tion. A possible alternative to taxation would be to specify the
total amount of admissible emissions or the admissible exploita-
tion of natural resources and to issue a respective number of
tradable permits [for the case of C0« emissions, see Grubb,
1989].
More research is definitively needed to evaluate the chances for
the implementation of a scheme of tradable permits in different
areas of environmental concern, and to assess in detail its pros
2
and cons as compared to eco-taxes. Generally, however, some
advantages of permits stand out. First, international efficiency
in containing global environmental degradation is relatively easy
to achieve. The market exchange of emission permits provides an
incentive to undertake abatement measures where they are most
cost effective. By contrast, the full harmonization of eco-taxes
would be a necessary precondition to equate the costs of further
abatement across sectors and countries. Such a harmonization
might be difficult to achieve.
Secondly, financial compensation is an integral factor in a
scheme of tradable permits. This is most evident if permits are
allocated on a per-capita basis to countries. Provided that moni-
toring problems were overcome, such a scheme would benefit coun-
tries in which per-capita emissions are relatively low and the
exploitation of natural resources remains limited. Generally,
developing countries would receive more permits than needed by
This is, of course, not to ignore that eco-taxes may have a
role to play with respect to containing environmental degrada-
tion in a national context.
2
Principally, an agreement on the overall number of permits
corresponds to an agreement on eco-tax rates. The allocation of
permits corresponds to the distribution of tax revenues. Common
problems of eco-taxes and tradable permits relate to difficul-
ties of monitoring and postcontractual instability [Mohr,
1991] .- 23 -
them. They may then sell permits to countries which are short of
permits because of environment-intensive production. Compensation
increases with intensified efforts of developing countries to
contain environmental degradation at home, since the number of
permits that could be sold increases. Transfers do not necessari-
ly decline to the same extent that environmental degradation is
contained in industrialized countries. Price increases in the
market for tradable permits may counteract this effect if the
overall number of permits is sufficiently reduced over time.
Finally, financial compensation arranged in this way may reduce
administrative and transaction costs. The collection and transfer
of payments does not require a large international bureaucracy,
but at most a clearing agency.
Financial compensation through tradable permits provides an al-
ternative in several areas of environmental concern, in which the
discussions have traditionally focused on taxation. As concerns
global environmental issues, the protection of the atmosphere
through a reduction of CO., emissions provides a case in point.
The permit scheme is also suitable to help resolve regional en-
vironmental problems, e.g. the pollution of international waters
caused by seabed mining; an excessive exploitation of antarctic
resources; and an excessive use of renewable natural resources
such as over-fishing. However, both eco-taxes and tradable
permits are not suitable to finance environmental protection in
areas where monitoring is virtually impossible. This applies, for
example, to the preservation of biological diversity.
To the extent that environmental protection in developing coun-
tries involves cross-border effects, the international funding
must, in practice, be related to a meaningful proxy variable. It
would be consistent with the concept of financial compensation to
collect annual contributions as a percentage share of the donors'
Among the open questions, future research may indicate whether
a reduction of the overall number of permits is easier to
achieve than a corresponding increase of eco-taxes in all par-
ticipating countries.- 24 -
GDP. The contributions to an environmental fund would then in-
crease with the size and per-capita income of countries. A coun-
try's size reflects its share in the consumption of the public
good "environmental protection". The per-capita income provides a
proxy for differences in time preference rates.
3. Allocation of Funds
The distribution of funds mobilized in this way among developing
countries undertaking environmental measures that benefit the
international community has to obey to the same principles. Dis-
bursements should be concentrated on low-income countries with
high time preference rates. However, experience with development
aid in the past tells that unconditional budgetary transfers are
unlikely to result in environmental improvements. Another debat-
able - though widely accepted - proposition is that environmental
protection in developing countries could be easily achieved by
foreign debt reduction. External transfers of whatever type and
magnitude cannot be a substitute for adequate policy incentives
in the recipient countries.
In order to establish an effective linkage between external
transfers and environmental protection, financial compensation
should take place in the context of lending for specific projects
with international spillovers. As concerns the focus of project
lending, the following points are noteworthy:
- First, external support must not be restricted to swap opera-
tions in highly indebted countries.
- Secondly, project financing should not be confined to narrowly
defined environmental purposes. Donors should also support
institution building and human resource development.
- Thirdly, project lending should be concentrated on developing
countries the ruling elites of which are committed to remove
the internal impediments to environmental improvements. Hence,
selectivity and greater flexibility in aid allocations among
low-income countries is required.- 25 -
Even if these conditions were met, problems of monitoring and
enforcing environmental protection in developing countries would
persist. Contract stability may be enhanced by incentive-compa-
tible institutional arrangements on the distribution and phasing
of transfers. Decisions on the distribution of project funds
should be based on a voting rule which mirrors the relative
shares of donors in funding an environmental facility. Such a
rule minimizes the risk that domestic financing of environment-
related projects is merely replaced by foreign financing. Hence,
it helps the mobilization of sufficient funds at an international
scale. The phasing of transfers may provide another safeguard for
external donors. The temptation of developing countries to renege
on earlier commitments to environmental protection is particular-
ly strong if financial compensation is granted as a once-and-
for-all lump sum payment. This temptation may be contained if
protective measures by the beneficiaries must precede the trans-
fer of compensatory payments. In the case of pro-rata payments,
the option is maintained to sanction the breach of earlier com-
mitments by a reduction of overall transfers.
4. Concluding Remarks
Economic fundamentals and past experience have to be taken into
account in designing adequate instruments to achieve financial
compensation. The focus of the ongoing North-South negotiations
should be placed on overcoming informational deficiencies with
regard to the costs and benefits of environmental conservation,
and on evaluating the relative merits and flaws of optional fi-
nancial instruments. Both issues have not received sufficient
attention so far.
In any event, financial compensation should not be regarded by
industrialized countries to be a substitute for trade liberaliza-
tion. Trade restrictions for processed and finished goods add to
the incentives of developing countries to deplete their natural
resource base. The pressure on Third World economies to earn
foreign exchange by exporting non-renewable raw materials could
be reduced if escalating import barriers against manufactured- 26 -
goods were removed. The links between trade, environment and
economic development deserve particular attention in the ongoing
UNCED negotiations. This also refers to the removal of barriers
to market entry and the phasing out of export subsidies in agri-
culture. International trade policy must not be used to raise
funds for an environmental financing facility, but as a means to
stimulate export diversification of commodity dependent economies
and induce a sustainable agricultural development in both indus-
trialized and developing countries.- 27 -
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